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INTRODUCTION	In	 this	 thesis,	 the	research	question	“Does	 the	world-systems	theory	still	have	validity	 to	
explain	the	trade	relationship	between	Brazil	and	the	U.S.	from	2001	until	2014?”	will	be	researched.	The	 world-systems	 theory	 is	 a	 well-known	 theory	 that	 is	 used	 in	 the	 academic	 world	 of	International	 Relations.	 The	 theory	 is	 a	model,	 based	 on	 the	 inter-regional	 and	 transnational	division	 of	 labor,	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relations	 between	 developed	 and	 less	 developed	economies.	The	theory	works	with	a	framework	that	divides	the	countries	of	the	world	into	three	main	 categories:	 core	 countries	 (highly	 developed	 countries),	 semi-peripheral	 countries	 (in	between	 core	 and	 periphery),	 and	 peripheral	 countries	 (developing	 countries).	 As	 stated	 by	Immanuel	Wallerstein,	who	invented	the	theory,	the	economies	of	core	countries	focus	on	capital-intensive	production,	and	the	semi-periphery	and	the	periphery	mainly	focus	on	labor-intensive	production	 and	 the	 export	 of	 raw	 materials.	 According	 to	 Wallerstein,	 this	 system	 of	 three	categories	constantly	reinforces	the	dominance	and	power	of	the	core	countries	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004).	 Moreover,	 according	 to	 Wallerstein’s	 world-systems	 theory,	 the	 division	 of	 the	 world	system	in	those	three	categories	needs	to	be	maintained,	since	this	framework	keeps	the	system	of	world	trade	and	world	politics	as	we	know	it	running.	However,	the	theory	was	first	established	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	and	thus	it	might	have	lost	its	validity	to	explain	the	current	global	reality.	Therefore,	 this	study	explores	whether	the	world-systems	theory	is	still	a	useful	model	to	explain	today’s	political	and	economic	global	reality,	or	that	it	needs	to	be	adapted	or	that	 it	 even	has	 to	make	place	 for	 an	entirely	new	 framework.	A	 case	 study	of	 trade	 relations	between	the	U.S.	and	Brazil	between	2001	and	2014	will	be	used	to	analyze	this	question.	This	research	is	very	useful,	because	it	might	give	important	insights	in	how	the	world-systems	theory	deals	with	the	changing	global	order,	and	if	not,	what	adaptions	or	changes	in	the	theory	could	be	effectuated	to	make	the	theory	more	relevant	and	correct	for	the	changing	world	system.	Also,	this	research	can	tell	us	a	lot	about	how	already	existing	theories	in	general	cope	with	 significant	 global	 changes,	 and	 if	 such	 theories	 can	 actually	 become	outdated	 in	 the	 first	place.	 Besides	 this,	 the	 case	 study	 of	 Brazil	 –	 U.S.	 relations	 between	 2001	 and	 2014	 is	 very	interesting,	as	 this	complex	relationship	 is	a	clear	representation	of	 the	world-system’s	 theory	core-periphery	 relation.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 global	 power	 relations	 have	 been	 studied	 for	centuries,	this	research	is	unique	since	it	will	be	studied	from	a	different	angle.	By	researching	if	the	world-systems	theory	still	has	validity	to	explain	Brazil	–	U.S.	trade	relations	between	2001	and	2014,	a	new	light	will	shine	on	the	issue	of	relations	between	the	world’s	core	and	the	world’s	periphery	but	also	on	the	basic	validity	of	the	world-systems	theory	in	the	modern	world.		
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In	order	to	answer	the	research	question,	the	world-systems	theory	and	various	critiques,	Brazil’s	 economic	 rise,	 its	 emerging	 South-South	 cooperation,	 and	U.S.	 –	Brazil	 trade	 relations	during	 the	 period	 from	 2001	 until	 2014	 will	 be	 analyzed.	 First,	 using	 process	 tracing,	 trade	numbers	between	Brazil	and	the	United	States	in	the	period	from	2001	until	2014	will	be	obtained	and	analyzed.	After	this,	it	will	be	linked	to	the	world-systems	theory.	In	this	way,	this	study	can	test	 if	 this	 theory	 is	still	valuable	when	explaining	Brazil	 -	U.S.	 trade	relations	 from	2001	until	2014.	The	given	timeframe	is	highly	relevant	for	answering	the	research	question,	since	O’Neill	first	wrote	about	Brazil	in	the	BRIC	concept	in	2001.	From	2001	onwards,	rising	Brazil	as	part	of	the	BRIC	countries	got	more	significant	attention	by	academics	and	scholars,	since	its	stature	in	international	politics	was	taken	more	seriously	after	this.	The	end	of	the	timeframe,	the	year	2014,	is	relevant	because	Brazil’s	economy	still	grew	significantly.	From	2015	onwards,	the	country’s	economic	growth	stagnated	because	of	the	economic	and	political	crises	the	country	is	currently	facing.		The	 first	 chapter	 provides	 a	 basic	 understanding	 of	 several,	 for	 this	 study	 relevant	theoretical	concepts:	North-South	divide,	South-South	cooperation,	and	the	world-system	theory.	After	this,	in	the	second	chapter,	the	thesis	gives	a	broad	historical	context,	in	order	to	provide	background	information	on	Brazil’s	economic	emergence	and	growing	stature	in	the	international	arena	 and	 therefore	 the	 country’s	 changing	 trade	 relations	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 This	historical	background	is	needed	to	be	able	to	fully	understand	the	analysis.	Subsequently,	in	the	analysis,	 which	 is	 the	 third	 chapter,	 this	 study	 provides	 information	 on	 Brazil	 –	 U.S.	 trade	relations,	including	information	on	Brazil’s	main	import	and	export	products,	the	country’s	main	import	origins	and	export	destinations,	and	Brazil’s	main	import	from	and	export	to	the	United	States.	 which	 will	 then	 be	 placed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 world-systems	 theory.	 	 At	 last,	 in	 the	conclusion,	the	world-systems	theory	will	be	tested	and	the	research	question	will	be	answered,	using	all	information	provided	in	this	thesis.	
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1.	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK	
1.1.	THE	NORTH-SOUTH	DIVIDE	AND	ITS	DECLINE	In	 order	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 concept	 of	 South-South	 cooperation	 and	 the	 world-systems	theory,	it	is	important	to	first	get	a	grip	on	the	historical	global	North-South	divide	and	its	decline	over	 the	 last	 two	 to	 three	 decades.	 “The	 basic	 North-South	 divide	 is	 structured	 around	 the	assumption	that	most	of	the	developing	countries	are	located	in	the	southern	part	of	the	globe	and	that	the	more	developed	countries	are	located	North	of	the	equator”	(Reuveny	&	Thompson,	2007,	 p.	 557).	Reuveny	 and	Thompson	 (2007,	 p.	 557)	 argue	 that,	 if	 you	 take	 into	 account	 the	logical	assumption	that	the	North	Pole	is	placed	at	the	top	of	our	planet,	the	majority	of	the	less	developed	states	are	 located	 in	 the	southern	part	of	 the	world	and	south	of	 the	richer	and	the	more	developed	countries,	which	are	mostly	placed	in	the	northern	part	of	the	earth.	Nonetheless,	 the	 terms	 “global	 South”	 and	 “global	 North”	 are	 not	 just	 geographical	concepts.	 Therefore,	 there	 are	 some	 problems	 with	 the	 concepts	 which	 causes	 tumult	 in	 the	academic	spheres	when	trying	to	define	the	actual	North-South	divide.	Reuveny	and	Thompson	(2007,	p.	557)	argue	 that	several	 states	belonging	 to	 the	global	North,	are	 located	 in	southern	parts	of	 the	world	 (for	example	Australia	and	New	Zealand).	Moreover,	Russia,	 a	 country	 that	always	belonged	to	the	less	developed	states	before	the	prosperity	kicked	in	because	of	its	natural	resources,	is	located	north	of	the	equator.	Furthermore,	the	authors	state	that	there	are	people	that	live	north	of	the	equator	which	are	poorer	than	some	people	that	live	south	of	the	equator.	In	other	words,	 the	 individual	situations	of	citizens	do	not	align	with	 the	 traditional	North-South	divide.	Nonetheless,	they	also	argue	that	the	concepts	“global	North”	and	“global	South”	work	“as	long	as	no	one	assumes	a	high	degree	of	homogeneity	in	the	two	zones”	(Reuveny	&	Thompson,	2007,	p.	557).	This	 is	why	the	concepts	of	 the	“global	North”	and	the	“global	South”	are	rather	socioeconomic	instruments	to	measure	world	politics	and	interstate	relations	than	geographically	correct.	According	 to	Thérien	 (1999,	p.	723)	 the	North-South	divide	was	 traditionally	 the	most	important	concept	to	explain	differences	in	wealth	between	both	individuals	and	countries.	He	argues	that	from	the	beginning	of	the	1960s	until	the	late	1980s,	the	divide	between	the	Northern	countries	 and	 the	 Southern	 states	 influenced	 policy	 makers	 and	 scholars	 worldwide.	 In	 this	context,	international	policies	were	mostly	designed	to	reform	international	institutions	so	that	the	countries	from	the	global	South	could	catch	up	with	the	developed	nations	from	the	global	North.	Moreover,	 in	 the	academic	world,	 the	division	between	 the	global	North	and	 the	global	South	formed	the	basis	for	many	studies	that	focused	on	international	relations,	and	the	global	political	 economy.	 This	 is	 also	 the	 case	 in	Wallerstein’s	 world-systems	 theory,	 which	 will	 be	
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explained	in	the	next	paragraph.	In	short,	In	the	past	century,	for	a	long	period	of	time,	the	division	of	 the	 world	 into	 developed	 states	 and	 developing	 states	 formed	 the	 framework	 of	 the	understanding	the	global	and	political	economy	(Thérien,	1999,	p.	723).	However,	according	to	the	World	Bank	(1994,	p.	5)	the	traditional	North-South	divide	is	becoming	less	important	and	not	as	evident	as	it	once	was,	as	the	economies	of	the	countries	from	the	global	South	have	been	growing	at	a	faster	pace	than	the	economies	of	the	industrial	northern	states.	Moreover,	the	World	Bank	states	that	“large	net	capital	flows	keep	flowing	into	developing	countries”	 (World	Bank,	 1994,	 p.	 5).	 After	 this	 statement	 of	 the	World	Bank,	more	 academics	expressed	their	support	 for	the	assumption	that	the	North-South	divide	could	no	 longer	shape	global	 debates	 on,	 for	 instance	 inequality	 and	 poverty.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 shifting	 economic	relations	between	the	global	North	and	the	global	South	created	a	new	balance	of	power	between	the	developed	and	developing	countries.	(Arrighi,	Silver,	&	Brewer,	2003).	Many	 scholars	 argued	 that	 the	 North-South	 divide	 is	 becoming	 less	 visible,	 and	 this	argument	 has	 gained	 support	 among	 well-known	 academics	 that	 focus	 on	 globalization	 and	International	Relations	(Harris,	1986;	Hardt	&	Negri,	2000;	Robinson	&	Harris,	2000;	Hoogvelt,	1997;	 Held,	 McGrew,	 Goldblatt,	 &	 Perraton;	 Burbach	 &	 Robinson,	 1999).	 According	 to	 these	academics,	the	global	changes	and	the	shift	that	caused	some	sort	of	international	restructuring	during	the	past	thirty	years	wiped	out	the	traditional	divide	between	developed	and	developing	countries.	 Burbach	 and	 Robinson	 (1999,	 p.	 28)	 argue:	 “Worldwide	 convergence,	 through	 the	global	restructuring	of	capitalism,	means	that	the	geographic	breakdown	of	the	world	into	North-South,	 core-periphery	 or	 First	 and	 Third	 worlds,	 while	 still	 significant,	 is	 diminishing	 in	importance”.	These	authors	also	state	that	the	tendencies	between	the	core	and	periphery	are	still	in	 operation,	 but	 rather	within	 states	 than	 between	 them.	Moreover,	 Hoogvelt	 (1997,	 p.	 145)	states	that	the	relations	between	the	core	and	periphery	are	becoming	more	focused	on	social	ties	than	on	the	geographical	ties.	However,	the	basic	Marxist	literature,	which	suggests	that	the	transnational	global	system	is	rising	because	of	world	market	capitalism,	states	that	the	tendencies	between	the	global	North	and	 the	 global	 South	 take	 place	 on	 a	 global	 level,	 and	 not	 per	 se	 within	 countries,	 although	domestic	 situations	 can	 derive	 from	 the	 international	 dynamics.	 Gonzalez-Vicente	 and	 Carroll	(2017,	p.	2)	affirm	this	by	arguing	that	changing	situations	within	the	nation-state,	such	as	the	rise	of	populism	and	nationalism	appear	to	be	a	result	of	the	“social	disembedding	of	markets	and	the	pre-eminence	 of	world	market	 capitalism”	 (Gonzalez-Vicente	&	 Carroll,	 2017,	 p.	 2).	 They	 also	stress	that	the	current	political	crises	in	many	countries	derive	from	global	changes.	For	instance,	nation-states	 that	 first	 focused	 on	 national	 development	 strategies	 now	 have	 a	 new	 focus	 on	
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transnationalism,	 which	 is	 increasingly	 influenced	 by	 competitive	 global	 economic	 market	dynamics	(Gonzalez-Vicente	&	Carroll,	2017,	p.	2).	Besides	 this,	 Thérien	 (1999,	 p.	 726)	 stresses	 an	 important	 matter.	 There	 are	 also	ideological	shifts	that	contributed	to	the	decrease	of	the	gap	between	the	global	North	and	the	global	South.	The	reason	for	these	ideological	changes	is	the	fact	that	crucial	information	about	traditional	North-South	relations	was	questioned	by	both	scholars	and	politicians.	According	to	the	author,	one	of	the	things	that	was	assumed	being	a	simple	fact,	was	that	the	global	South	would	consist	of	a	well	identified	and	homogeneous	group	of	states.	However,	this	particular	view	could	not	be	maintained	after	the	beginning	of	the	shift	in	the	world	order	in	the	1980s	and	the	1990s,	because	in	the	past	two	to	three	decades,	the	gap	between	countries	within	the	global	South	have	been	 widening.	 For	 instance,	 high-performance	 economies	 of	 East	 Asia	 and	 the	 stagnating	economies	 of	 sub-Saharan	 Africa	 are	 different	worlds,	 and	 therefore	 they	 could	 no	 longer	 be	grouped	 into	 one	 group	 called	 “global	 South”.	 This	 heterogeneity	 that	 arose	within	 the	 global	South,	but	also	the	shifts	that	took	place	in	the	traditional	global	North	show	that	the	descriptive	value	of	the	“North-South”	concept	becomes	more	unclear	every	day.	Nevertheless,	there	exist	scholars	who	argue	that	the	North-South	gap	is	actually	getting	bigger	in	all	but	some	of	the	Third	World	countries.	Broad	and	Melhorn	Landi	(1996,	p.	7)	stress	that	the	World	Bank	did	not	use	enough	data	to	give	strength	to	the	assumption	of	the	narrowing	gap,	since	it	only	uses	“aggregate	data”	and	since	it	provides	data	from	just	one	to	three	years.	They	state	that	“a	closer	and	longer	look	at	North-South	data	reveals	that,	while	the	gap	may	be	closing	 between	 a	 few	 developing	 countries	 -	 particularly	 the	 10	 big	 emerging	 markets	 pin-pointed	by	 the	US	Department	of	Commerce	and	 the	 industrial	 countries,	 the	vast	majority	of	Third	World	countries	are	slipping	further	behind	the	North”	(Broad	&	Melhorn	Landi,	1996,	p.	7).	 Thérien	(1999,	p.	724)	explains	that	the	parameters	of	the	debate	about	the	traditional	North-South	divide	have	 changed	 in	unprecedented	ways.	This	 is	why	 shifts	have	been	 taking	place	within	this	divide	 in	the	 last	 two	to	three	decades.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	designate	one	specific	reason	for	this	shift,	since	there	is	no	total	consensus	between	scholars	that	study	the	decline	of	the	North-South	divide.	For	some	scholars,	the	traditional	divide	is	declining	because	of	“the	rise	of	a	more	mature	partnership	between	nation-states”	(ul	Haq,	1995,	p.	204),	while	others	state	that	the	global	South	cannot	longer	be	seen	as	a	homogeneous	group	of	countries	in	current	world	affairs	(Gilpin,	1987,	p.	304).	Also,	some	of	the	academics	argue	that	the	developed	countries	of	the	North	have	created	an	own	“internal	South”,	and	that	this	internal	South	is	a	“layer	of	society”	that	is	totally	integrated	into	the	global	North	(Cox	&	Sinclair,	1996,	p.	531).	Regarding	this,	it	is	
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impossible	to	offer	a	clear	representation	of	why	changes	took	place,	therefore	it	can	rather	be	seen	as	a	set	of	different	factors	that	caused	the	shift	(Thérien,	1999,	p.	724).	
 Carlsson’s	(1982)	argues	that	the	most	significant	change	in	global	politics	since	the	1970s	is	that	the	basic	structure	of	the	international	economic	system	transformed.	He	states	that	the	traditional	division	of	the	world	into	two	parts,	a	center	and	a	periphery,	made	place	for	a	new	sort	of	tripolar	division,	with	the	addition	of	a	middle	category,	which	Wallerstein	calls	the	“semi-periphery”.	The	rise	of	the	so-called	semi-periphery	causes	a	growing	hierarchization	of	the	global	South.	According	to	Carlsson,	 it	 is	one	of	the	most	significant	phenomena	of	the	modern	world	economy.	
1.2.	SOUTH-SOUTH	COOPERATION	Linked	to	the	traditional	North-South	decline,	as	explained	in	the	previous	paragraph	is	the	rise	of	South-South	cooperation	and	a	tripartite	division	of	the	world.	Not	only	is	it	possible	to	see	the	emergence	 of	 the	 political	 ties	 of	 countries	 in	 the	 global	 South,	 but	 the	 commercial	 contacts	between	 these	 countries	 have	 also	 been	 increasing	 in	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 decades.	 These	commercial	 contacts	 between	 southern	 countries,	 that	 are	 formed	 by	 trade	 and	 capital	 flows	between	states,	were	not	as	present	in	the	beginning	of	the	19th	century,	when	the	international	economy	 and	 the	 traditional	 division	 of	 labor	was	 based	 on	 traditional	 North-South	 contacts.	Therefore,	extensive	relations	with	the	South	were	largely	excluded	(Carlsson,	1982,	p.	10).		South-South	cooperation,	or	the	cooperation	between	(semi-)peripheral	countries	of	the	global	South	 is	a	mechanism	through	which	countries	of	 the	global	South	can	strengthen	their	economic	and	political	ties	in	order	to	become	less	dependent	on	the	industrialized	core	countries	of	the	global	North	(de	la	Fontaine	&	Seifert,	2009,	p.	2).	As	Carlsson	(1982,	p.	45)	argues,	“South-South	cooperation	allows	developing	nations	to	construct	relations	with	other	developing	nations	to	overcome	underdevelopment	and	in	order	to	construct	regional	advantages	for	every	country	involved”.		However,	there	exist	several	problems	with	the	concept	of	South-South	cooperation	in	the	academic	environment.	Some	scholars	state	that	the	concept	is	imprecise	and	that	it	can	be	used	to	define	any	kind	of	 relations	between	countries	of	 the	global	South.	Moreover,	 linked	 to	 this	problem	is	that	South-South	cooperation	is	not	being	used	consistently	by	different	scholars	and	policymakers	and	that	the	concept	has	been	changing	significantly	over	the	past	decades	(de	la	Fontaine	&	Seifert,	2009,	p.	3).	Moreover,	Carlsson	(1982,	p.	48)	points	out	that	the	concept	of	South-South	cooperation	does	not	take	into	account	the	traditional	economic	asymmetries	and	the	possible	dependencies	between	states	from	the	global	South.	His	exact	words	were:	“the	most	serious	 problem	 is	 not	 connected	 with	 the	 actual	 establishment	 of	 intra-South	 trade,	 but	 it’s	
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general	 effects	 on	 the	 development	 prospects	 of	 its	 participants”	 (Carlsson,	 1982,	 p.	 48).	 This	means	that	the	traditional	economic	asymmetries	between	the	global	North	and	the	global	South	can	be	repeated	within	the	relatively	new	relations	between	countries	of	the	global	South,	which	could	cause	the	exclusion	of	the	weaker	economies	of	the	South.	
1.3.	WORLD-SYSTEMS	THEORY	The	world-systems	theory	first	came	into	existence	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	as	a	part	of	the	modern	world	system.	After	1945,	economic	cooperation	between	countries	changed	dramatically,	and	as	a	consequence,	the	entire	global	system	changed	in	very	important	ways.	As	a	 result	 of	 the	 global	 changes,	 academics	 looked	 for	 new	 and	 different	 manners	 to	 explain	economic,	 social	 and	 political	 reality.	 According	 to	 Immanuel	 Wallerstein,	 there	 are	 three	important	 occurrences	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 past	 century	 that	 played	 a	 large	 role	 in	 the	emergence	of	new	academic	theories.	First	of	all,	the	United	States	became	the	world’s	hegemonic	power.	As	 the	hegemonic	power	of	 the	world	system,	 the	U.S.	university	 system	automatically	became	the	most	influential	one.	Secondly,	the	developing	part	of	the	world	became	the	breeding	ground	of	“political	turbulence	and	geopolitical	self-assertion”	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004,	p.	9).	The	last	important	change	is	the	fact	that	the	world	economy	was	expanding	very	fast	and	“the	increasing	democratizing	tendencies	of	the	world	university	system”	(2004,	p.	9)	grew	accordingly.		These	three	 significant	 changes	weakened	 the	 traditional	 International	 Relations	 theories	 that	were	developed	 over	 a	 hundred	 years	 ago.	 Already	 established	 theories	 became	 useless	 for	 policy	makers	in	the	West,	since	scholars	who	were	able	to	analyze	political	issues	in	the	Global	South	rather	 than	 scholars	 who	 could	 only	 study	 their	 extinct	 languages	 or	 the	 way	 of	 life	 of	 their	ancestors	were	needed.	In	fact,	the	newly	established	modern	world-system	asked	for	new	ways	of	 studying	 global	 issues	 and	 international	matters.	 This	 is	when	Wallerstein’s	world-systems	theory	 got	 more	 attention	 and	 support	 from	 scholars	 and	 academics	 all	 over	 the	 world	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004).			The	world-systems	theory,	first	coined	by	Immanuel	Wallerstein,	is	referred	to	as	a	new	perspective	 to	explain	 social	 and	economic	 reality.	The	basic	 framework	of	 the	world-systems	theory	 is	 that	 the	 world	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 different	 stages	 of	 domestic	 economic	development	 within	 the	 current	 world	 system	 and	 within	 the	 global	 political	 economy.	 The	different	stages	are	 the	 following:	 	 the	core	 (highly	developed	economies),	 the	semi-periphery	(economies	in	between	the	core	and	the	periphery),	and	the	periphery	(developing	economies).	Countries	are	placed	into	one	of	the	categories	by	determining	the	different	political	and	economic	roles	of	the	state	or	the	geographic	area	within	the	overall	world	system	and	world	economy.			
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The	transnational	division	of	labor	in	the	capitalist	world	economy	is	crucial	to	adequately	explain	 the	 world-systems	 theory’s	 framework	 of	 different	 categories	 (Petras,	 1981).	 In	 the	world-systems	 theory,	 the	 relation	 between	 core	 countries,	 semi-peripheral	 countries,	 and	peripheral	countries	is	the	degree	of	profitability	of	the	production	processes.	In	other	words,	the	core-periphery	 relations	 are	based	on	 the	 transnational	 division	of	 labor,	which	 is	 part	 of	 the	modern	capitalist	world-economy.	Wallerstein	(1975)	argues	that	the	transnational	division	of	labor	 forms	 the	 framework	 for	 explaining	 the	 value	 flows	 from	 the	 periphery	 to	 the	 core.	Wallerstein	explains	that	the	value	flows	from	the	periphery	towards	the	core	is	needed	to	“keep	the	monopoly	forms	of	capitalism	in	the	core”	(Petras,	1981,	p.	149).	Wallerstein’s	world-systems	theory	accepts	unequal	change	and	therefore	world	inequality	in	general.	According	to	the	world-systems	theory,	these	are	simply	crucial	factors	of	historical	capitalism.		The	transnational	division	of	labor	divides	production	processes	into	core-like	production	processes	(mostly	in	core	countries)	and	peripheral	production	processes	(mostly	in	peripheral	countries)	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004,	p.	28).	Core-like	production	processes	are	processes	which	are	almost	always	controlled	by	a	small	amount	of	core	countries.	These	production	processes	can	easily	be	monopolized,	as	developing	economies	do	not	possess	the	core-like	production	and	labor	skills	 (Straussfogel,	 1997,	 p.	 120).	 Unlike	 core-like	 production	 processes,	 the	 peripheral	production	processes	are	characterized	as	highly	competitive.	They	require	less	skilled	and	more	extensive	labor	(Straussfogel,	1997,	p.	120).	Some	economies	possess	an	almost	even	distribution	of	 core-like	 and	 peripheral	 production	 processes,	 these	 kinds	 of	 countries	 are	 called	 semi-peripheral.	However,	according	to	the	world-systems	theory,	it	does	not	make	sense	to	define	the	semi-peripheral	production	processes	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004).		Regarding	these	differences,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	modern	world	system	is	characterized	by	a	global	shift.	This	means	that	what	is	defined	as	a	core-like	production	process	now,	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 peripheral	 production	 process	 tomorrow	 (Wallerstein	 I.	 ,	 2004,	 p.	 29).	Wallerstein	 gives	 a	 clear	 to	 explain	 this	 phenomenon:	 the	 production	 of	 textile	 was	 very	innovative	 and	 exclusive	 in	 1800	 and	 it	was	 exclusively	 produced	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 core	countries.	However,	200	years	later,	in	the	year	2000,	the	production	of	textile	became	normal	and	a	large	amount	of	(semi-)peripheral	states	adopted	the	production	process.	The	production	of	 textile	was	not	only	 relocated	 to	 (semi-)peripheral	 countries	because	 the	process	would	be	cheaper	because	of	the	lower	wages	in	these	states,	but	also	because	the	core	regions	of	the	world	are	busy	 exploring	new	core-like	 and	 innovative	production	processes,	which	will,	 in	 the	 end,	experience	the	same	cycle	as	the	production	of	textile.	
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Wallerstein	(2004)	explains	that	when	exchange	between	core	products	and	peripheral	products	takes	place,	the	products	that	derive	from	peripheral	production	processes	are	mostly	in	a	weak	position,	whereas	the	core	products	are	in	a	strong	position.	The	consequence	of	this	is	that	there	exists	a	“constant	flow	of	surplus-value	from	the	producers	of	peripheral	products	to	the	producers	of	core-like	products”	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004,	p.	28).	This	is	what	we	call	“unequal	change”.	 	According	to	Wallerstein	(2004,	p.	28),	quasi-monopolies	are	often	dependent	on	the	patronage	of	core	states,	and	thus	they	are	largely	located	within	such	states.	Also,	Wallerstein	makes	clear	that	“core-like	processes	tend	to	group	themselves,	physically,	juridically,	and	also	in	terms	of	ownership,	 in	a	small	number	of	states”	(2004,	p.	28).	However,	he	stresses	 that	“the	peripheral	 processes	 are	 scattered	 among	 a	 large	 number	 of	 countries”	 (2004,	 p.	 28).	 These	geographical	 differences	 between	 core-like	 and	 peripheral	 production	 processes	 affect	 the	relations	between	the	core	states	and	the	peripheral	states,	and	Wallerstein	argues	that	“this	is	why	we	 talk	 about	 core	 states	 and	 (semi-)peripheral	 states,	when	we	are	 really	 talking	of	 the	relationship	between	production	processes”	(2004,	p.	28)	.		As	explained,	Wallerstein	 (2004,	p.	29)	argues	 that	 the	role	of	every	state	 in	 the	world	system	 is	 different	 because	 of	 the	 production	 processes	 depending	 on	 the	mix	 of	 core-like	 or	peripheral	 processes	 within	 it.	 Core	 states	 often	 try	 to	 stress	 their	 role	 of	 protecting	 quasi-monopolies	of	the	core-like	processes.	However,	the	“weaker”	states,	that	can	be	categorized	into	the	periphery	do	not	have	the	ability	to	affect	the	axial	division	of	labor,	since	they	are	very	much	forced	to	accept	the	role	they	have	been	given	by	the	core	states.	Wallerstein	also	argues	that	it	can	be	said	that	the	economies	of	the	semi-peripheral	states,	which	consist	of	both	core-like	and	peripheral	production	processes,	 are	placed	 in	 the	most	difficult	 situation.	This	 is	because	 the	countries	belonging	to	the	semi-peripheral	category	feel	pressured	by	the	core	states,	while	the	semi-peripheral	states	are	putting	pressure	on	the	peripheral	states	at	the	same	time	(2004,	p.	29).	Thus,	the	first	priority	of	semi-peripheral	states	is	not	to	fall	into	the	peripheral	category	and	to	do	everything	in	their	power	to	keep	developing	in	order	for	those	countries	to	enter	the	core	category.	 Besides	 this,	 semi-peripheral	 states	 are	 the	 ones	 that	make	 use	 of	 the	 protectionist	policies	in	order	to	“protect	the	national	production	processes	from	the	competition	of	stronger	firms	on	the	other	side	of	the	borders”	(Wallerstein	I.	,	2004,	p.	29).	At	the	same	time,	the	focus	lies	on	improving	the	efficiency	of	the	domestic	firms	to	be	able	rival	better	in	the	global	market.	Most	 semi-peripheral	 states	 are	 recipients	 of	 the	 relocation	 of	 certain	 leading,	 mostly	manufactured,	 products	 as	 well	 and	 this	 is	 often	 seen	 as	 an	 impulse	 for	 further	 economic	development.	However,	Wallerstein	(2004,	p.	29)	also	states	that	the	semi-peripheral	states	that	receive	those	leading	products	have	to	compete	with	other	countries	in	the	semi-periphery,	since	those	countries	are	also	trying	to	develop	by	receiving	the	same	high-end	products.	However,	the	leading	products	can	impossibly	be	exported	to	all	semi-peripheral	states	that	wish	to	import	it,	
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and	neither	can	the	same	amount	of	these	products	be	exported	to	all	of	those	countries.	In	short,	according	 to	Wallerstein’s	 world-systems	 theory,	 “all	 semi-peripheral	 countries	 are	 countries	with	strong	enterprises	that	export	products	to	peripheral	zones,	but	that	also	regularly	relate	to	core	zones	as	importers	of	more	advanced	products”	(2004,	p.	30).		In	this	research,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	in	the	already	existing	literature,	Brazil	is	mostly	 allocated	 in	 the	 semi-peripheral	 category.	 Also,	 it	 is	 as	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 the	existing	literature	about	the	world-systems	theory	and	about	global	order	and	politics	in	general,	mostly	defines	the	United	States	as	a	core	country,	although	it	is	not	necessarily	directly	put	in	these	exact	words.	Wallerstein	himself	also	allocated	the	United	States	in	the	list	of	core	countries	(Wallerstein	 I.	M.,	 1979,	 p.	 101),	 since	 he	 argues	 that	 the	U.S.	 economy	 is	 based	 on	 industrial	production	 processes,	 which	 stimulates	 the	 production	 of	 high-end	 end	 products.	 Moreover,	Brazil	 is	 on	 the	 list	Wallerstein	 himself	made	 to	 sum	up	 the	 countries	 belonging	 to	 the	 semi-periphery	(Wallerstein	I.	M.,	1979,	p.	100).	Besides	this,	Babones	(2005)	claims	that	the	majority	of	other	scholars	and	academics	who	attempted	to	allocate	 the	countries	of	 the	world	 into	 the	Wallersteinian	categories	allocated	Brazil	in	the	semi-peripheral	category	and	the	United	States	in	 the	 core	 category	as	well.	The	different	 literature	 in	which	Brazil	 and	 the	United	States	are	allocated	 into	Wallerstein’s	 framework,	 all	 result	 in	 roughly	 similar	groups	of	 countries	 in	 the	core,	the	periphery,	and	the	semi-periphery,	even	though	they	did	not	use	similar	methods	and	data	 to	divide	 the	countries	 into	 the	 three	zones	of	 the	world	system.	 “Analyses	of	patterns	of	trade,	network	analyses	of	economic,	political,	and	military	relationships,	or	analyses	of	different	income	 levels	 in	 certain	 countries	were	 used	 to	 categorize	 the	 states”	 (Babones,	 2005,	 p.	 29).	According	 to	Babones	 (2005,	 p.	 29),	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 results	 are	 still	 roughly	 the	 same	 could	confirm	the	basic	validity	of	Wallerstein’s	world-systems	model.	However,	 although	 at	 first	 sight,	 the	 world-systems	 theory	 seems	 very	 complete	 and	accurate,	it	has	undergone	several	academic	critiques	already.	For	instance,	Straussfogel	(1997,	p.	118)	argues	that	the	theory	lacks	basic	theoretical	unity,	because	scholars	who	do	research	from	a	world-systems	theory	approach	often	use	the	theory’s	concepts	for	their	personal	interests.	In	other	words,	there	are	scholars	that	twist	concepts	for	their	own	benefits,	and	Wallerstein	allows	them	to	do	so,	since	the	world-systems	theory	was	not	accurately	defined.		Straussfogel	also	states	that	 the	 result	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 theoretical	 congruence	 is	 a	 rich	 academic	 literature	 on	 various	aspects	of	the	history	of	capitalism’s	influence	in	many	places,	but	she	also	argues	that	there	is	an	inconsistency	in	the	definition	and	the	application	and	ambiguity	as	to	what	the	world-systems	theory	is	really	about.	Moreover,	Straussfogel	explains	that	it	is	sometimes	unclear	if	the	world-systems	theory	can	be	seen	as	“an	organizing	and	explanatory	framework	for	the	past	history	of	
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world	capitalism	or	an	aid	 to	our	understanding	of	 the	current	global	economy”	(Straussfogel,	1997,	p.	118).	The	vagueness	of	the	theory	is	mentioned	by	more	academics.	Arrighi	and	Drangel	(1986,	pp.	13-14)	also	question	the	theory’s	conceptual	shortcomings.	For	instance,	the	semi-peripheral	zone	does	not	have	a	clear	definition	other	than	“economy’s	somewhere	between	the	core	and	the	periphery”.	 Terlouw	even	 states	 that	 the	 semi-periphery	 is	 a	 “blurred	 zone	 on	 the	 continuum	between	core	and	periphery”	(Terlouw,	1993,	p.	87),	which	means	that	what	is	between	the	core	and	the	periphery	is	completely	unclear.	Arrighi	and	Drangel	(1986,	p.	14)	also	stress	that	the	list	of	 countries	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 semi-periphery	 that	Wallerstein	made,	 does	 not	 contain	much	science.	They	argue	 that	 the	 list	 just	 includes	basically	all	 countries	 that	have	an	 intermediate	position	in	the	global	arena,	because	of	their	income	levels	or	their	power	in	the	world	system.	According	to	the	authors,	there	is	no	clear	connection	between	the	concepts	of	income	level	and	power,	since	power	is	a	relative	and	unclear	concept.	In	other	words,	a	list	like	this	should	have	been	created	without	referencing	to	the	concept	of	power,	or	by	using	concepts	that	are	logically	connected	in	order	to	make	sense.	It	is	also	very	important	to	make	clear	that	the	way	in	which	world-systems	theory	defines	its	categories	might	not	align	with	how	the	current	global	economic	hierarchization	works.	The	traditional	division	between	peripheral	production	processes	and	core-like	production	processes	does	 not	 necessarily	 represent	 the	 current	 economic	 hierarchies	 in	 the	world,	 because	many	manufacturing	industries	were	moved	to	the	emerging	economies	because	of	the	cheaper	labor.	This	of	course	caused	a	decrease	of	the	prices	of	industrial	products	and	an	increase	of	the	natural	resource	prices.	Therefore,	it	could,	in	some	situations,	be	quite	problematic	to	use	the	traditional	division	of	the	world-systems	theory	in	order	to	explain	the	current	global	economic	inequalities.		
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2.	HISTORICAL	FRAMEWORK	
2.1.	BRAZIL’S	ECONOMIC	GROWTH	It	was	not	until	the	2000s	that	the	Brazilian	economy	started	to	emerge	and	grow	at	a	very	fast	pace.	 Although	 Brazil	 already	 went	 through	 important	 political	 changes,	 especially	 when	 the	country	returned	to	a	democratic	regime	in	the	late	1980s,	the	domestic	development	was	still	dependent	on	the	financial	and	policy	commitments	to	the	IMF.	According	to	Erthal	Abdenur,	this	is	 why	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 was	 not	 able	 to	 boom	 until	 the	 2000s,	 and	 thus	 why	 Brazil	experienced	 “stagnant	 or	 negative	 economic	 growth	 and	 why	 the	 country’s	 socioeconomic	equality	increased	sharply”	during	this	period	(2014,	p.	1881).	However,	in	the	beginning	of	the	2000s,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 started	 to	 emerge	 significantly	 and	 Brazil	 started	 to	 become	 a	serious	global	 economic	power.	One	of	 the	most	 important	 incentives	 for	 this	growth	was	 the	increasing	Chinese	demand	for	Brazilian	natural	resources,	such	as	iron	ore	and	soy,	which	was	needed	for	the	Chinese	newly	industrialized	economy.	The	 enormous	 potential	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 did	 not	 remain	 unnoticed.	 In	 2001,	O’Neill,	was	the	first	to	write	about	the	concept	“BRIC”	(O'Neill,	2001).	BRIC	was	an	abbreviation	for	a	group	of	countries	that	has	the	potential	to	become	the	largest	economies	in	the	global	arena	in	just	twenty	years.	O’Neill’s	BRIC	includes	the	economies	of	Brazil,	Russia,	India,	and	China.	In	O’Neill’s	working	paper,	he	argues	that	the	economies	of	the	BRICs	countries	are	very	capable	of	surpassing	the	G7	economies.	The	economic	importance	and	power	of	the	BRIC	countries	can	be	dedicated	to	the	collective	geographical	size	of	the	states.	Together,	the	economies	consisted	of	43%	of	the	entire	world	population,	and	18%	of	the	world’s	GDP.	According	to	Nayyar	(2016,	p.	575),	the	BRIC	countries	did	not	only	obtain	power	through	the	collective	economic	size,	but	they	also	became	more	important	because	of	the	collective	voice	they	possess	in	the	world,	where	the	balance	 of	 power	 has	 been	 shifting	 from	 the	 global	 North	 towards	 the	 global	 South	 since	 the	1980s.		After	his	groundbreaking	article	attracted	attention	from	both	scholars	and	academics,	the	perception	that	economic	power	is	shifting	from	the	West	to	“the	rising	rest”	arose	further.	The	idea	that	emerging	southern	countries	are	assuming	more	 important	roles	 in	the	 international	economy	 became	 very	 popular	 among	 a	 lot	 of	 important	 academics	 and	 scholars	 (Cooper	 &	Antkiewicz,	2008;	Cox	M.	,	2007;	Hurrell,	2006;	Hurrell,	2010;	Ikenberry,	2008;	Mahbubani,	2008).	The	fact	that	Brazil	was	mentioned	by	O’Neill	as	a	partaker	in	the	BRIC	and	that	many	scholars	adopted	the	view	of	Brazil	as	a	power	that	could	shake	up	the	Western	world	is	highly	relevant	for	this	research,	since	it	shows	that	Brazil	is	a	very	serious	and	important	actor	in	the	global	shift	away	from	the	traditional	core	countries	from	the	traditional	global	North.	
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Hurrell	(2006)	is	one	of	the	many	scholars	who	absolutely	agreed	with	the	idea	that	the	BRIC	 countries	 could	 rise	 and	 surpass	 the	 traditional	 Northern	 global	 powers	 at	 a	 fast	 pace.	According	to	Hurrell,	the	rising	BRICS	countries	all	possess	some	sort	of	economic,	military	and	political	power	recourses.	He	also	states	that	these	countries	all	have	“the	capacity	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	international	order,	regionally	or	globally”	(Hurrell,	2006,	p.	1).	Furthermore,	he	explains	that	these	countries	have	“some	degree	of	internal	cohesion	and	capacity	for	effective	state	 action”	 (Hurrell,	 Hegemony,	 liberalism	 and	 global	 order:	what	 space	 for	would-be	 great	powers?,	2006,	p.	1).	Also	important	is	that	all	of	the	emerging	BRICS	countries	“share	a	belief	in	their	entitlement	to	a	more	influential	role	in	world	affairs”	(Hurrell,	2006,	p.	2),	and	that	there	is	a	strong	development	of	political	and	economic	relations	between	and	among	the	BRICS	states.	Years	later,	in	2014,	Brazil	can	be	seen	as	the	leader	of	the	entire	Latin-American	region,	and	according	 to	Das	and	Das,	 it	 is	now	 “one	of	 the	world’s	 largest	democracies,	 achieving	an	impressive	7,5%	growth	rate	in	2010,	a	record	high	since	1986”	(2014,	p.	13).	Nevertheless,	in	2014	Brazil’s	economy	was	still	largely	based	on	the	export	of	raw	materials.	This	was	already	the	case	in	the	colonial	period	(in	the	16th	century),	when	sugar	was	Brazil’s	main	export	product	(Das	&	Das,	2014,	p.	13).	The	Brazilian	economy	was	also	still	based	on	the	country’s	agriculture	 in	2014.	
2.2.	THE	RISE	OF	BRAZIL’S	SOUTH-SOUTH	COOPERATION	The	rise	of	Brazil’s	South-South	cooperation	can	be	seen	within	the	framework	of	the	country’s	rising	economic	importance	of	the	past	two	decades.	The	change	in	Brazil’s	foreign	policy	from	the	1990s	onwards	can	be	characterized	by	the	decline	of	 the	 isolated	position	that	Brazil	had	within	the	world	system,	as	until	the	90s,	Brazil	was	governed	by	the	military	forces	(1964	–	1985)	and	 the	country	 focused	on	 industrialization	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	substitute	 imports	 (Import	Substitution	–	ISI)	(de	la	Fontaine	&	Seifert,	2009,	p.	5).	During	the	period	from	roughly	1930	until	roughly	1980,	the	import	substitution	industrialization	model	was	one	of	the	key	components	of	Brazil’s	economy,	in	which	the	state	played	a	central	part.	The	result	of	the	state’s	influence	in	the	national	 industrial	 policy	was	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 had	 the	 “discretionary	 power	 to	 influence	many	variables	and	prices	in	the	economy”	(Guimarães,	2010,	p.	49).	According	to	Guimarães	(2010,	p.	50),	this	strategy	did	produce	important	results	for	the	Brazilian	economy,	since	it	helped	Brazil	to	create	 “a	more	advanced	and	more	complex	 industrial	 infrastructure”.	However,	Guimarães	also	makes	clear	that	the	period	of	Import	Substitution	Industrialization	in	Brazil	caused	serious	limits	for	the	country’s	economy,	as	it	was	a	breeding	ground	for	inflation	and	it	caused	problems	with	 the	balance	of	payments.	The	 limitations	of	 the	system	therefore	caused	 the	 fact	 that	 the	development	of	a	modern	capital	goods	 industry	and	the	promotion	of	advanced	technological	capacity	failed	at	last	(Guimarães,	2010,	p.	50).	
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After	 the	 period	 of	 Brazil’s	military	 government,	 and	 after	 the	 crisis	 of	 Brazil’s	 import	substitution	development	model,	it	was	president	Collor	de	Mello	who	pleaded	for	a	more	liberal	economy,	 that	would	be	 less	dominated	by	 the	 state	government.	Moreover,	he	also	opted	 for	Brazil’s	regional	integration	and	he	focused	on	the	country’s	position	within	the	global	economy.	Although	Collor	de	Mello	was	the	first	Brazilian	president	who	actively	focused	on	international	integration	and	cooperation,	his	 ideas	were	mostly	adopted	and	worked	out	by	his	successors	president	Franco,	Cardoso,	and	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	(de	la	Fontaine	&	Seifert,	2009,	p.	5).	Both	 former	 president	 Collor	 de	 Mello	 and	 former	 president	 Cardoso	 focused	 on	 the	county’s	position	within	world	market	by	emphasizing	Brazil’s	economic	ties	with	core	countries	such	as	the	United	States	and	countries	from	the	European	Union.	However,	it	was	the	popular	president	Lula	da	Silva	who	really	began	 to	 focus	more	on	South-South	relations	and	stronger	regional	bonds	with	other	Latin	American	countries	(Vigevani	&	Cepaluni,	2007).	Saraiva	(2007)	argues	that	there	exists	a	difference	between	Brazil’s	old	South-South	cooperation	and	its	new	South-South	cooperation.	The	author	states	that	in	the	beginning,	Brazil’s	previous	governments	focused	on	increasing	the	relations	with	the	global	South	because	of	economic	issues	on	a	regional	level.	A	clear	example	of	this	kind	of	regional	South-South	relations	is	the	creation	of	the	Common	Market	of	the	South	(Mercosul)	in	1991.	However,	especially	when	president	Lula	da	Silva	came	into	office	and	the	Brazilian	economy	began	to	grow	substantially,	Brazil	began	to	focus	more	and	more	 on	 strengthening	 its	 economic,	 political,	 technical	 and	 cultural	 relationships	 with	 other	developing	 nations	 outside	 of	 Latin-America.	 Examples	 of	 Brazil’s	 relatively	 new	 South-South	cooperation	are	its	international	relations	with	other	states	from	the	BRICS	initiative,	including	countries	 from	 outside	 the	 region,	 and	 Brazil’s	 rising	 development	 assistance	 to	 developing	countries	in	Africa.	When	 in	2006,	 the	national	oil	 company	Petrobras	discovered	 large	oil	 reserves	 in	 the	South	Atlantic	Brazilian	coastline,	the	Brazilian	economy	gained	an	extra	impulse.	Combined	with	the	leftist	Lula	government	which	focused	firmly	on	diversifying	the	international	relations,	this	also	caused	an	increase	in	Brazil’s	South-South	cooperation	(Erthal	Abdenur,	2014,	p.	1882).	Also,	when	analyzing	Brazil’s	rising	South-South	cooperation,	it	is	essential	to	mention	the	emerging	ties	 between	 Brazil	 and	 the	 Latin	 American	 region	 in	 general	 and	 China.	 Erthal	 Abdenur	 and	Marcondes	de	Souza	Neto	(2013,	p.	69)	explain	that	China’s	relations	with	Brazil	and	the	rest	of	Latin	America	only	emerged	in	the	past	ten	years,	not	only	because	of	the	growing	trade	relations	between	China	and	the	region,	but	also	because	of	“political,	cultural,	security,	and	technical	ties”.	According	to	the	authors,	this	cooperation	between	Brazil	and	China	has	caused	a	lot	of	benefits,	as	China	is	now	Brazil’s	most	important	trade	partner.	China	imports	raw	materials	from	Brazil,	and	exports	industrial	products	to	Brazil.	Besides	these	commercial	benefits,	this	relatively	new	
	 17	
established	 Southern	 cooperation	 also	 caused	 new	 global	 dynamics	 between	 countries	 with	regards	to	economic	competition	(Erthal	Abdenur	&	Marcondes	de	Souza	Neto,	2013,	p.	71).		Another	 factor	 that	 contributed	 to	Brazil’s	 international	 focus	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 since	 the	1990s,	Brazil’s	national	companies	began	to	internationalize	at	a	fast	pace,	and	the	Latin	American	region	 and	 the	 global	 South	 in	 general	 became	more	 important	 in	 terms	 of	 global	 trade	 and	international	politics.	Flynn	(2007)	even	states	that	Brazil	had	gained	a	“sub-imperialist	position”	with	the	internationalizing	private	markets.	Moreover,	Oliveira	and	Pfeifer	(2008,	p.	391)	explain	that	in	the	1990s	an	opening	of	Brazil’s	foreign	policy	system	emerged.	Reasons	for	this	were	the	country’s	 general	 democratization	 process,	 economic	 liberalization	 and	 privatization.	 These	processes	gave	national	businesses	a	more	important	and	autonomous	role	in	the	domestic	and	international	decision-making	processes.	Besides	 this,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 stress	 that,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Brazil	 still	 remained	 a	recipient	 of	 financial	 and	 technical	 aid	 from	 mostly	 core	 countries,	 the	 country	 became	 a	significant	actor	in	the	provision	of	development	assistance	to	developing	countries	in	the	global	South,	especially	during	the	period	that	president	Lula	was	in	office.	According	to	Dauvergne	and	Farias	 (2012,	 p.	 909),	 president	 Lula	 made	 sure	 that	 he	 kept	 mentioning	 Brazil’s	 capacities	regarding	development	assistance	towards	the	global	South,	by	stating	that	Brazil	has	always	been	more	than	just	a	Third	or	Second	world	country.	One	of	the	most	important	reasons	for	Brazil’s	shift	 from	 being	 a	 recipient	 of	 development	 aid	 to	 becoming	 an	 important	 provider	 of	development	 assistance	 is	 the	 fact	 the	 Brazil	 became	 a	 rapidly	 emerging	 world	 economy.	However,	president	Lula’s	firm	emphasis	on	South-South	cooperation	plays	a	big	part	in	this	as	well.	The	focus	that	Lula	put	on	South-South	cooperation	is	stronger	than	that	of	any	of	Brazil’s	previous	 government	 administrations.	 Yumie	 Aoki	 Inoue	 and	 Costa	 Vaz	 (2012,	 p.	 511)	 even	mention	 that	 Brazil’s	 increasing	 South-South	 cooperation	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 reasons	 that	 the	country	provides	technical	and	financial	aid	to	developing	countries	in	the	first	place.	Regarding	the	country’s	role	as	a	donor	of	development	assistance,	it	is	clear	Brazil	cannot	be	seen	as	just	another	country	belonging	to	the	global	South.	However,	development	aid	is	not	the	only	reason	why.	During	the	last	two	decades,	Brazil	assumed	the	unofficial	role	as	“leader	of	the	developing	countries	from	the	global	South”.	Logically,	the	position	of	Brazil	as	a	significant	provider	of	developmental	aid	combined	with	its	rapidly	emerging	economy	contributed	to	the	country’s	strong	ties	with	other	countries	 from	the	global	South	 in	general.	Bry	(2017,	p.	297)	explains	this	by	stressing	that	Brazil’s	role	as	an	important	donor	of	development	assistance	is	very	important	for	the	country’s	international	image	and	general	stature	within	the	global	arena.	
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The	author	even	argues	that	becoming	a	donor	of	technical	and	financial	assistance	has	helped	Brazil	to	raise	its	general	international	stature	globally,	but	also	regionally.	Nevertheless,	the	fact	that	from	2003	onwards	Brazil	started	to	focus	more	on	South-South	relations	as	well	as	on	regional	integration	and	providing	development	assistance,	the	country’s	governments	 never	 had	 the	 objective	 to	 obstruct	 the	 country’s	 relations	 with	 its	 developed	partners	from	the	core	category,	especially	the	ties	with	the	United	States	and	countries	from	the	European	 Union.	 According	 to	 Flynn	 (2007,	 p.	 10),	 Brazil	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 economic	 and	political	bonds	with	these	countries,	because	those	core	countries	form	an	enormous	part	of	the	country’s	 international	market	 for	 its	natural	 resources.	Moreover,	 the	author	argues	 that	 this	“economic	 foreign	 policy	 orientation	 is	 triggered	 by	 the	 country’s	 integration	 into	 the	 global	capitalist	economy”	(Flynn,	2007,	p.	10).	
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3.	ANALYSIS	
3.1.	CASE	STUDY:	BRAZIL	–	U.S.	TRADE	RELATIONS	(2001	–	2014)	
3.1.1.	EXPORT	AND	IMPORT	PRODUCTS	In	order	to	explain	Brazil’s	allocation	within	the	world-systems	theory,	and	to	accurately	answer	the	research	question	of	this	thesis,	it	is	of	crucial	importance	to	mention,	order	and	analyze	the	country’s	most	important	import	and	export	products	within	the	given	timeframe	of	2001	until	2014,	 because	 the	 quality,	 level,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 products	 can	 say	 a	 lot	 about	Brazil’s	general	 position	within	 the	world	 system	and	more	 importantly,	within	 the	 framework	of	 the	three	Wallersteinian	 categories	of	 the	world-systems	 theory.	As	explained	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	according	to	Wallerstein,	the	production	of	goods	and	the	degree	of	industrialization	of	domestic	production	 processes,	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 industrialization	 of	 a	 country’s	 import	 and	 export	products	are	crucial	when	categorizing	states	into	the	core,	the	periphery	or	the	semi-periphery.	Table	1	until	table	4	show	the	top	10	Brazilian	export	and	import	products	in	both	2001	and	2014.	By	comparing	the	tables	with	information	from	2001	to	the	tables	with	data	from	2014,	a	general	image	can	be	created	of	the	changes	that	have	occurred	during	the	period	between	these	years.	However,	although	table	1	until	table	4	clearly	show	the	type	of	products	that	Brazil	imported	and	exported	in	2001	and	2014,	it	forms	just	a	general	framework	for	Brazil’s	changing	position	in	the	world-system,	which	can	later	be	used	for	analyzing	the	country’s	bilateral	trade	relations	with	the	United	 States	 and	 for	 describing	 how	 these	 relations	 can	possibly	 be	 linked	 to	 the	world-systems	theory.	As	can	be	seen	in	table	1,	Brazil’s	total	export	value	was	61.2	billion	dollars	in	2001.	The	main	export	products	of	Brazil	in	2001	were	mostly	raw	materials,	such	as	iron	ore,	soybeans,	raw	sugar,	meat,	and	coffee.	However,	unlike	what	one	would	expect	from	an	economy	largely	driven	by	agriculture,	a	significant	part	of	Brazil’s	exports	in	2001	also	consisted	of	high-end	industrial	goods,	 such	 as	 planes,	 helicopters,	 and/or	 spacecraft,	which	 even	 accounted	 for	 the	 country’s	absolute	main	export	product	with	a	contribution	of	5,9%	of	the	total	exports.	Other	industrial	products	such	as	cars	and	vehicle	parts	also	contributed	significantly	in	Brazil’s	total	export	value	in	2001	(Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity,	n.d.).		Table	2	shows	that	 in	2014,	Brazil’s	main	export	products	still	mostly	consisted	of	raw	materials	and	natural	resources,	even	more	than	in	2001,	when	industrial	products	such	as	planes,	helicopters,	and/or	spacecraft	and	cars	were	still	 in	the	top	10	of	Brazilian	export	products.	In	table	2	it	is	also	clearly	visible	that	the	contribution	of	Iron	Ore,	Soybeans,	and	Crude	Petroleum	to	 the	 total	 export	 value	 grew	 enormously	 between	 2001	 and	 2014,	 whereas	 the	 industrial	
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products	 such	 as	 planes,	 helicopters,	 and/or	 Spacecraft,	which	were	 a	 very	 important	 part	 of	Brazil’s	exports	in	2001,	did	not	even	make	the	top	10	of	the	country’s	export	products	in	2014.	Thus,	when	comparing	table	1	and	table	2	it	becomes	clear	that	the	exports	of	mineral	products	such	 as	 iron	 ore	 and	 crude	 petroleum	 grew	 substantially	 and	 continuously	 during	 the	 given	timeframe,	whereas	the	exports	of	the	more	technical	and	high-end	products	stagnated	from	2001	until	2014.		When	comparing	the	country’s	exports	of	2001	to	its	exports	in	2014,	the	most	striking	difference	is	the	fact	that	in	the	period	between	these	years,	Brazil’s	total	export	value	increased	enormously.	 As	 pointed	 out,	 in	 2001	 the	 Brazilian	 total	 export	 value	was	 61,2	 billion	 dollars,	whereas	in	2014,	the	total	export	value	increased	to	228	billion	dollars.	This	outraging	increase	of	Brazil’s	export	value	is	obviously	caused	by	the	country’s	rapid	economic	growth	of	the	past	two	decades	(as	explained	in	chapter	two),	but	it	is	also	a	consequence	of	the	increasing	Brazilian	focus	 on	 international	 cooperation	 and	 international	 trade	 between	 2001	 and	 2014	 (also	explained	in	chapter	two).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	1:	Top	10	Brazilian	export	products	in	20011	 	 	Table	2:	Top	10	Brazilian	export	products	in	2014	2	But	it	is	not	only	the	main	export	products	that	give	a	clear	framework	for	understanding	Brazil’s	allocation	in	the	world	system.	It	is	also	necessary	to	take	a	close	look	at	the	country’s	type																																									 																					1	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	export?	(2001).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2001/		2 	Source:	 Observatory	 of	 Economic	 Complexity.	 (n.d.).	 What	 does	 Brazil	 export?	 (2014).	 Retrieved	 from	 The	Observatory	 of	 Economic	 Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2014/	
Product	 %	Total	
exports	
($61,2B)	1. Planes,	Helicopters,	and/or	Spacecraft	 5,9%	2. Iron	Ore	 5,2%	3. Soybeans	 4,5%	4. Raw	Sugar	 3,8%	5. Soybean	Meal	 3,6%	6. Cars	 3,3%	7. Leather	Footwear	 2,3%	8. Poultry	Meat	 2,1%	9. Refined	Petroleum	 2,1%	10. Sulfate	Chemical	Woodpulp	 2,1%	
Product	 %	Total	
exports	
($228B)	1. Iron	Ore	 12%	2. Soybeans	 10%	3. Crude	Petroleum	 7,2%	4. Raw	Sugar	 4,3%	5. Poultry	Meat	 3,2%	6. Soybean	Meal	 3,1%	7. Coffee	 2,7%	8. Sulfate	Chemical	Woodpulp	 2,5%	9. Frozen	Bovine	Meat	 2,1%	10. Refined	Petroleum	 1,8%	
	 21	
of	 import	 products,	 since	 this	 also	 forms	 a	 part	 of	 the	 description	 of	 the	 country’s	 economy	between	 2001	 and	 2014.	 Moreover,	 by	 not	 only	 comparing	 Brazil’s	 most	 important	 export	products	in	2001	and	in	2014,	but	also	by	comparing	Brazil’s	main	import	products	in	both	years,	a	more	complete	and	complex	evidence	based	representation	of	 the	country’s	economy	can	be	created		In	2001,	Brazil’s	total	import	value	was	worth	56,9	billion	dollars.	As	pointed	out	in	table	3,	Brazil’s	main	import	products	in	2001	mostly	consisted	of	high-end	industrial	products,	such	as	machinery,	cars,	telephones,	computers	and	more.	The	fact	that	Brazil’s	most	important	import	products	are	mainly	manufactured	goods	says	a	lot	about	the	degree	of	the	country’s	domestic	industrialization.	In	this	case,	Brazil	imports	these	products	as	for	some	reason,	its	own	economy	does	not	produce	 these	 industrial	products.	Moreover,	Brazil’s	 absolute	main	 import	products	consist	of	crude	petroleum	and	refined	petroleum.	Although	Brazil	is	a	big	oil	producer	in	Latin	America,	the	country	does	not	produce	enough	to	match	the	enormous	domestic	demand,	which	is	why	Brazil	still	needs	to	import	crude	petroleum.	Also,	the	Brazilian	refining	structure	is	not	suitable	to	process	its	own	oil	resources,	and	therefore	Brazil	needs	to	import	refined	petroleum	since	the	country	itself	is	not	able	to	produce	this	(Duran,	2013).											
Table	3:	Top	10	Brazilian	import	products	in	2001	3	 	 Table	4:	Top	10	Brazilian	import	products	in	20144	
																																								 																					3	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	import?	(2001).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/all/show/2001/		4	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	import?	(2014).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/all/show/2014/	
Product	 %	Total	
imports	
($56,9B)	1. Crude	Petroleum	 5,2%	2. Refined	Petroleum	 4,3%	3. Vehicle	Parts	 2,7%	4. Integrated	Circuits	(Machinery)	 2,5%	5. Cars	 2,4%	6. Telephones	 2,4%	7. Gas	Turbines	(Machinery)	 2,3%	8. Office	Machine	Parts	 2%	9. Planes,	Helicopters,	and/or	Spacecraft	 1,8%	10. Computers	 1,7%	
Product	 %	Total	
imports	
($228B)	1. Refined	Petroleum	 7,5%	2. Crude	Petroleum	 6,1%	3. Petroleum	Gas	 3,6%	4. Cars	 3,4%	5. Vehicle	Parts	 3,1%	6. Telephones	 2,2%	7. Integrated	Circuits	(Machinery)	 2%	8. Packaged	Medicaments	 1,6%	9. Pesticides	 1,5%	10. Broadcasting	Accessories	 1,4%	
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Table	4	shows	that	in	2014,	apart	from	the	total	import	value	that	grew	from	56,9	billion	dollars	to	228	billion	dollars,	not	much	has	changed	with	regards	to	the	type	of	import	and	export	products.	 The	 largest	 contribution	 to	 the	 total	 import	 value,	 besides	 petroleum	 and	 gas,	 still	consisted	 of	 industrial	 products	 such	 as	 telephones,	machinery	 and	 broadcasting	 accessories.	Besides	 this,	 the	 contribution	 of	 imports	 of	 pesticides	 has	 increased	 as	 well,	 since	 Brazil’s	agricultural	 sector	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 economy	boomed	during	 the	 period	 from	2001	until	 2014	(largely	 due	 to	 China’s	 rising	 demand	 for	 Brazilian	 natural	 resources),	 and	 pesticides	 are	necessary	 to	 gain	 absolute	 benefits	 of	 the	 agricultural	 production	 processes.	 Besides	 this,	 the	imports	of	refined	petroleum	replaced	crude	petroleum	as	the	main	import	product.	This	could	be	due	to	the	fact	that	in	the	first	half	of	2008,	a	new	oil	field	in	the	pre-salt	in	the	Santos	Basin	was	 discovered	 (Duran,	 2013),	 and	 because	 of	 this,	 Brazil	 does	 not	 need	 to	 import	 as	 much	petroleum	 as	was	 needed	 before	 this	 discovery.	 Refined	 petroleum	keeps	 being	 an	 important	contribution	 to	 Brazil’s	 total	 imports	 in	 2014,	 since	 Brazil	 does	 not	 process	 crude	 petroleum	domestically	(Duran,	2013).	
3.1.2.	EXPORT	DESTINATIONS	AND	IMPORT	ORIGINS	Just	like	analyzing	Brazil’s	main	import	and	export	products,	it	is	also	indispensable	to	stress	the	country’s	most	significant	export	destinations	and	import	origins,	because	this	provides	a	clear	image	of	Brazil’s	basic	commercial	relations	during	the	given	timeframe	of	this	study.	Therefore,	the	top	10	Brazilian	export	destinations	and	import	origins	from	2001	until	2014	are	illustrated	in	table	5	until	table	8.	These	tables	show	the	destinations	where	Brazil	mostly	exported	to	and	the	origins	where	Brazil	mostly	imported	from	in	2001	and	2014.	As	can	be	seen	in	table	3,	the	United	States	was	Brazil’s	main	export	destination	in	2001.	24%	of	all	Brazilian	exports,	which	had	a	value	of	14,7	billion	dollars	went	to	the	United	States.	Moreover,	it	is	remarkable	that	most	of	Brazil’s	exports	went	to	core	countries	in	2001,	such	as	the	United	States,	the	country	that	accounted	for	the	largest	contribution	of	all	Brazilian	export	destinations,	 but	 also	 Germany,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Italy,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	 Belgium-Luxembourg.	However,	when	 looking	closely	at	 table	4,	 it	becomes	clear	 that	a	shift	 regarding	Brazil’s	main	export	destinations	has	taken	place	between	2001	and	2014.	 In	2014,	Brazil	still	exported	a	large	value	of	exports	towards	the	core	countries	the	United	States,	the	Netherlands,	and	Germany,	and	although	the	absolute	value	that	is	exported	towards	these	core	countries	is	significantly	bigger	than	in	2001,	the	relative	contribution	of	these	countries	to	the	total	Brazilian	export	strongly	decreased.		Nonetheless,	 the	 most	 striking	 shift	 in	 in	 terms	 of	 top	 Brazilian	 export	 destinations	between	2001	and	2014	is	that	the	contribution	of	total	exports	towards	the	United	States	was	halved	from	24%	in	2001	to	just	12%	in	2014.	But	the	United	States’	decreasing	importance	as	an	
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export	destination	for	Brazil	is	not	the	only	remarkable	difference	during	the	period	from	2001	until	2014.	From	table	3	and	table	4	it	can	be	concluded	that	China	assumed	a	significantly	more	important	role	as	an	export	market	for	Brazil	between	2001	and	2014.	In	2001,	3,2%	of	Brazil’s	total	exports	went	to	China,	whereas	in	2014	China	is	Brazil’s	main	export	destination	with	an	amount	of	18%	of	all	Brazilian	exports	that	go	to	China.	The	cause	for	this	notable	shift	is	the	fact	that	China’s	rapid	economic	growth	of	the	past	two	decades	provoked	a	significant	increase	in	the	prices	and	demand	for	products	such	as	soybeans,	poultry	meat,	iron	ore,	and	other	raw	materials,	which	are	largely	exported	by	Brazil.	A	consequence	of	the	increasing	Chinese	demand	for	raw	materials	 is	 the	 rapid	 rise	 of	 the	 economies	 that	 are	 driven	 by	 agricultural	 goods	 and	 raw	materials,	like	Brazil.	China	is	thus	a	very	important	market	to	export	raw	materials	to.	It	is	not	only	the	most	important	export	destination	for	Brazil	in	2014,	but	also	for	Chile.	Moreover,	China	is	also	in	the	top	5	of	export	destinations	for	Peru.	One	of	the	most	important	results	of	the	growing	Chinese	 demand	 for	 raw	 materials	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 Brazil	 to	 diversify	 its	 exports	 to	 other	destinations	 than	 the	United	States,	which	 causes	a	decrease	U.S.	 influence	 in	Brazil	 (Sabatini,	2013,	p.	10).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	5:	Top	10	Brazilian	export	destinations	in	20015	 	 Table	6:	Top	10	Brazilian	export	destinations	in	20146	In	2001,	the	United	States	was	not	only	the	most	important	export	destination	for	Brazil.	When	analyzing	where	Brazil	mainly	imported	from	in	2001,	it	can	be	concluded	that	a	big	part	of	24%	of	Brazil’s	 imports	 came	 from	 the	United	States.	This	 is	 almost	a	quarter	of	Brazil’s	 total	
																																								 																					5	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	Where	does	Brazil	export	to?	(2001).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/all/2001/		6	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	Where	does	Brazil	export	to?	(2014).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/all/2014/	
Export	destinations	 %	Total	
exports	
($61,2B)	1. United	States	 24%	2. Argentina	 8,4%	3. Germany	 4,9%	4. The	Netherlands	 4,5%	5. Japan	 3,5%	6. China	 3,2%	7. Italy	 3,2%	8. Mexico	 3,2%	9. United	Kingdom	 3%	10. Belgium-Luxembourg	 2,8%	
Export	destinations	 %	Total	
exports	
($228B)	1. China	 18%	2. United	States	 12%	3. Argentina	 6,3%	4. The	Netherlands	 4,7%	5. Germany	 3,6%	6. Japan	 3,3%	7. Chile	 2,3%	8. India	 2,2%	9. Venezuela	 2,0%	10. South	Korea	 1,8%	
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import	 products.	 Other	 important	 import	 origins	 in	 2001	 are,	 as	 shown	 in	 table	 7,	 Argentina,	Germany,	and	Japan.		 As	can	be	seen	in	table	8,	in	2014	the	United	States	still	continues	to	be	a	significant	origin	for	Brazil’s	import	products.	However,	China	also	replaced	the	United	States	as	the	main	Brazilian	import	origin.	This	is	the	consequence	of	China’s	economic	growth	and	industrialization.	Because	of	 China’s	 emerging	 industrialization,	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 industrial	 production	 processes	 have	 been	moved	to	China,	because	of	cheaper	labor.	Now	that	China	produces	high	quality	end	products.	Brazil	strengthened	its	bilateral	trade	relations	with	China	to	be	able	to	create	more	variety	in	import	markets	for	industrialized	goods.	Brazil’s	focus	on	South-South	cooperation	(as	explained	in	chapter	2)	also	plays	a	part	in	this.	Besides	this,	more	has	changed	with	regards	to	the	main	import	origins	between	2001	and	2014.	As	can	be	seen	in	table	8,	Brazil	imports	more	and	more	from	other	countries	in	the	global	South.	For	example,	India	made	the	top	10	of	import	origins	in	2014,	whereas	it	was	not	an	important	import	origin	for	Brazil	in	2001.	A	reason	for	this	is	the	tight	Southern	cooperation	of	the	BRICS	countries,	of	which	Brazil	is	part	(as	explained	in	chapter	2),	but	also	 India’s	economic	growth	and	 technical	advances	 from	the	 last	 twenty	years.	 	Also,	Nigeria	became	a	more	important	import	origin	for	Brazil	in	2014	as	well,	although	this	is	mostly	oil	and	petroleum	based.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	7:	Top	10	Brazilian	import	origins	in	20017	 	 			Table	8:	Top	10	Brazilian	import	origins	in	20148	
																																									 																					7	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	Where	does	Brazil	import	from?	(2001).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/all/2001/	
8	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	Where	does	Brazil	import	from?	(2014).	Retrieved	from	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/all/2014/	
Import	origins	 %	Total	
imports	
($228B)	1. China	 16%	2. United	States	 15%	3. Argentina	 6,1%	4. Germany	 6%	5. Nigeria	 3,8%	6. South	Korea	 3,8%	7. India	 2,9%	8. Italy	 2,8%	9. Japan	 2,5%	10. France	 2,5%	
Import	origins	 %	Total	
imports	
($56,9B)	1. United	States	 24%	2. Argentina	 11%	3. Germany	 8,9%	4. Japan	 5,4%	5. France	 4%	6. Italy	 4%	7. South	Korea	 2,8%	8. China	 2,5%	9. United	Kingdom	 2,2%	10. Spain	 2,2%	
	 25	
3.1.3.	EXPORT	TO	AND	IMPORT	FROM	THE	UNITED	STATES	In	order	 to	analyze	and	 test	 the	validity	of	 the	world-systems	 theory	when	explaining	Brazil’s	trade	relations	with	the	United	States	between	2001	and	2014,	studying	the	type	of	export	and	import	products	from	Brazil	towards	the	United	States	and	from	the	United	States	towards	Brazil	in	2001	and	2014	is	crucial.	By	collecting	data	(see	table	9	until	12)	of	Brazil’s	main	import	and	export	 products	 from	 and	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 a	 framework	 for	 the	 complex,	 shifting	 trade	relations	between	the	two	countries	can	be	created.	Also,	gaining	knowledge	about	the	type	of	import	and	export	products	from	Brazil	towards	the	United	States	and	vice	versa	is	important	in	order	 to	 link	 the	 changing	 trade	 relations	 to	 the	 world	 systems	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 test	 the	legitimacy	of	the	world-systems	theory	within	this	particular	case	study.	In	 2001,	 Brazil	 exported	 a	 total	 amount	 of	 14,7	 billion	 dollars	 to	 the	 United	 States.	 It	already	became	clear	that	in	this	year,	the	United	States	was	the	main	export	destination	for	Brazil.	But	what	kind	of	products	did	Brazil	exactly	export	to	the	United	States?	By	studying	the	data	in	table	 9,	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 one	 particular	 type	 of	 product	 stands	 out	 from	 the	 rest.	 Planes,	helicopters	and/or	spacecraft	are	good	for	15%	of	the	total	Brazilian	exports	to	the	United	States.	Moreover,	it	is	also	clear	that	besides	planes,	helicopters	and/or	spacecraft,	cars,	and	broadcasting	equipment,	most	of	the	exports	towards	the	United	States	can	be	categorized	as	natural	resources	and	raw	materials.			In	2014,	the	total	amount	of	exports	from	Brazil	to	the	United	States	almost	doubled	in	the	period	 from	 2001	 until	 2014.	 Although	 this	 is	 a	 huge	 increase	 in	 Brazilian	 trade	 towards	 the	United	States,	it	is	not	very	significant	compared	to	the	increase	of	Brazil’s	total	export	value	from,	which	rose	with	approximately	272%.	In	2014,	 the	main	Brazilian	export	product	towards	the	United	 States	 was	 crude	 petroleum.	 This	 is	 remarkable,	 since	 crude	 petroleum	 did	 not	 even	appear	in	the	top	10	Brazilian	exports	products	to	the	United	States	in	2001.	Also,	as	can	be	seen	in	table	10,	planes,	helicopters,	and/or	spacecraft	is	still	an	important	export	product	towards	the	United	States	in	2014.	As	was	shown	in	table	1	and	2,	the	export	of	planes,	helicopters,	and/or	spacecraft	was	Brazil’s	most	important	export	product	in	general	in	2001,	but	in	2014,	it	did	not	even	contribute	significantly	 to	Brazil’s	 total	export	value.	The	 fact	 that	 these	products	do	still	contribute	a	big	part	in	Brazil’s	total	exports	to	the	United	States	is	therefore	very	interesting,	as	this	 could	 indicate	 that	 the	 United	 States	 still	 imports	 industrialized	 products	 from	 Brazil.	However,	besides	the	planes,	helicopters,	and/or	spacecraft,	all	other	export	products	in	the	top	10	are	raw	materials.	Thus,	it	can	be	stated	that	Brazil’s	industrial	exports	to	the	United	States	stagnated	from	2001	until	2014,	whereas	the	exports	of	prime	materials	increased	between	these	years.	
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Table	9:	Top	10	Brazilian	export	products	to	the	U.S.	in	20019	 Table	10:	Top	10	Brazilian	export	products	to	the	U.S.	
in	201410	Table	11	shows	that	in	2001,	Brazil	mostly	imported	technical	industrial	products,	such	as	computers,	telephones,	and	machinery	from	the	United	States.	Whereas,	as	can	be	seen	in	table	12,	in	2014	a	big	part	of	the	total	imports	from	the	United	States	consisted	of	refined	petroleum,	petroleum	gas,	but	also	products	for	Brazil’s	agricultural	economy,	such	as	pesticides	and	mixed	mineral	of	chemical	fertilizers.	A	striking	difference	between	2001	and	2014	can	also	be	found	in	the	 fact	 that	 Brazil	 imported	 significantly	 less	 manufactures	 goods	 from	 the	 United	 States.		Regarding	 this,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 Brazil	 explored	 other	 options	 like	 the	 newly	 industrialized	economies	of	China	and	India,	which	could	offer	the	same	goods	at	a	lower	price	rate,	to	import	these	kinds	of	products.				
																																								 																					9	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	export	to	the	United	States?	(2001).	Retrieved	from	 Observatory	 of	 Economic	 Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/usa/show/2001/	
10	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	export	to	the	United	States?	(2014).	Retrieved	from	 Observatory	 of	 Economic	 Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/usa/show/2014/		
Product	 %	Total	
Exports	to	U.S.	
($14,7B)	1. Planes,	Helicopters,	and/or	Spacecraft	 15%	2. Leather	Footwear	 7,4%	3. Refined	Petroleum	 6,6%	4. Broadcasting	Equipment	 5,7%	5. Cars	 4,1%	6. Gold	 2,6%	7. Vehicle	Parts	 2,4%	8. Sulfate	Chemical	Woodpulp	 2,4%	9. Pig	Iron	 2,3%	10. Semi-finished	Iron	 2%	
Product	 %	Total	
Exports	to	U.S.	
($27,6B)	1. Crude	Petroleum	 14%	2. Planes,	Helicopters,	and/or	Spacecraft	 7,2%	3. Semi-Finished	Iron	 5,4%	4. Coffee	 4,7%	5. Gas	Turbines	 3,6%	6. Sulfate	Chemical	Woodpulp	 3,3%	7. Building	Stone	 2,7%	8. Pig	Iron	 2,5%	9. Steel	Ingots	 2,4%	10. Alcohol	 1,8%	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	11:	Top	10	Brazilian	import	products	from	the	U.S.	in	200111					 	Table	12:	Top	10	Brazilian	 import	products	 from	
the	U.S.	in	201412	
3.2.	LINKING	THE	DATA	TO	THE	WORLD-SYSTEMS	THEORY		When	tending	to	link	the	obtained	data	from	the	previous	paragraphs	to	the	world-systems	theory	in	order	to	test	the	validity	of	the	theory,	it	is	important	to	focus	on	two	different,	important	areas:	1)	Brazil’s	general	position	in	Wallerstein’s	world	system	by	analyzing	the	country’s	top	import	and	export	products	and	its	main	import	and	export	destinations,	and	2)	Brazil’s	trade	relations	with	the	United	States	by	analyzing	Brazil’s	most	important	import	from	and	export	to	the	United	States	 First	 of	 all,	when	 looking	 at	 Brazil’s	 general	 top	 export	 products	 in	 2001	 and	 2014,	 it	became	clear	that	in	both	2001	and	2014,	the	most	important	export	products	consisted	of	raw	materials.	And,	apart	from	the	enormous	growth	in	export	and	import	values,	the	exports	of	raw	materials,	 mostly	 mineral	 products,	 grew	 significantly	 between	 2001	 and	 2014,	 whereas	 the																																									 																					11	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	import	from	the	United	States?	(2001).	Retrieved	from	 Observatory	 of	 Economic	 Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/usa/show/2001/	
12	Source:	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity.	(n.d.).	What	does	Brazil	import	from	the	United	States?	(2014).	Retrieved	from	 Observatory	 of	 Economic	 Complexity:	http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/usa/show/2014/	
Product	 %	Total	imports	
from	U.S.	
($13,8B)	1. Gas	Turbines	 7,5%	2. Planes,	Helicopters,	and/or	Spacecraft	 5,2%	3. Office	Machine	Parts	 5,1%	4. Integrated	Circuits	(Machinery)	 4,4%	5. Computers	 3,8%	6. Telephones	 2,9%	7. Electric	Generating	Sets	 2,4%	8. Aircraft	Parts	 1,9%	9. Broadcasting	Accessories	 1,8%	10. Packaged	Medicaments	 1,6%	
Product	 %	Total	imports	
from	U.S.	
($35,3B)	1. Refined	Petroleum	 14%	2. Gas	Turbines	 5,2%	3. Petroleum	Gas	 3%	4. Pesticides	 2,7%	5. Coal	Briquettes	 2,3%	6. Packaged	Medicaments	 2,3%	7. Wheat	 2,1%	8. Mixed	Mineral	of	Chemical	Fertilizers	 1,9%	9. Medical	Instruments	 1,8%	10. Human	or	Animal	Blood	 1,9%	
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exports	of	Brazilian	high-end	and	 industrial	products	stagnated	 in	 this	period.	At	 first	sight,	 in	light	 of	 the	 world-systems	 theory,	 Brazil,	 a	 country	 that	 was	 already	 allocated	 in	 the	 semi-peripheral	category	because	of	its	mix	of	peripheral	and	core-like	production	processes,	would	still	not	be	able	to	enter	the	core	category,	since	the	country	still	mainly	focused	on	exporting	raw	materials	in	2014,	and	instead	of	developing	its	industrial	economy,	the	main	exports	still	mostly	consisted	of	agricultural	and	mineral	products,	which	according	to	the	world-systems	theory,	can	be	categorized	as	peripheral	production	processes.	Moreover,	by	analyzing	the	country’s	main	import	products,	it	became	clear	that	the	raw	commodities	such	as	petroleum	and	gas	were	the	most	important	import	products	for	Brazil	in	both	2001	and	2014.	However,	besides	these	products,	the	country’s	main	import	products	mostly	consisted	of	high-end	industrial	products	in	2001,	and	also	in	2014.	It	can	thus	be	stated	that	big	changes	with	regards	to	the	type	of	import	products	did	not	take	place	between	2001	and	2014.	According	to	the	world-systems	theory,	countries	whose	economies	focus	on	raw	materials	and	peripheral	 production	 processes	 need	 to	 compensate	 the	 lack	 of	 high-end	 manufactures	 by	importing	 from	 countries	 whose	 economies	 are	 based	 on	 core-like	 production	 processes	 and	industrial	 products.	When	 looking	 at	 Brazil’s	main	 import	 products	 in	 2001	 and	 in	 2014,	 the	world-systems	 theory	would	 assume	 that	Brazil	 cannot	 be	 categorized	 into	 the	 core	 category,	since	 the	 country	 depends	 on	 core	 states	 and	 their	 industrial	 economies	 for	 the	 industrial	products.	However,	it	is	very	important	to	stress	that	the	way	in	which	the	world-systems	theory	defines	its	categories	might	not	align	with	how	the	current	global	economic	hierarchization	works.	The	 traditional	 division	 between	 peripheral	 production	 processes	 and	 core-like	 production	processes	does	not	necessarily	represent	the	current	economic	hierarchies	in	the	world	anymore,	as	many	manufacturing	industries	were	moved	to	emerging	economies	like	China	or	India	because	of	the	cheaper	labor	in	those	countries.	This,	of	course,	caused	a	decrease	of	the	prices	of	industrial	products	and	an	increase	of	the	natural	resource	prices.	Therefore,	an	economy	based	on	core-like	 production	 processes	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 richer	 or	 stronger	 economy.	 This	 can	 also	 be	stated	for	the	economies	that	are	focused	on	peripheral	production	processes.	These	economies	are,	in	today’s	world,	not	necessarily	the	poorest	or	the	weakest.	For	these	reasons,	it	can	be	quite	problematic	 to	use	the	traditional	division	of	 the	world-systems	theory	 in	order	to	explain	the	current	global	economic	inequalities.		Unlike	Brazil’s	main	import	products	between	2001	and	2014,	interesting	shifts	have	been	taking	place	regarding	the	country’s	main	import	origins	and	export	destinations.	As	explained	in	the	previous	paragraph,	 the	most	 important	shift	during	 this	period	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	United	
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States,	which	was	Brazil’s	main	import	and	export	destination	in	2001,	no	longer	maintained	this	position	 in	2014.	China	 replaced	 the	United	States	by	 fulfilling	 this	 role.	 In	 light	 of	 the	world-systems	 theory,	 it	 is	 interesting	 that	 a	 “semi-peripheral”	 country	 like	 Brazil	 becomes	 less	dependent	 on	 the	 core	 state	 and	world’s	 hegemon	 the	United	 States,	 and	 that	 Brazil	 is	 in	 the	position	 to	 explore	 other	 (southern)	 options,	 like	 China,	 for	 its	 international	 trade	 relations.	According	 to	 the	 world-systems	 theory,	 the	 system	 of	 the	 three	 categories	 continuously	strengthens	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 core	 states.	 However,	when	 analyzing	 Brazil’s	main	 import	origins	and	export	destinations,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	core	state,	in	this	case	the	United	States,	loses	 economic	 power	 and	 influence	 over	 Brazil.	 Therefore,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 this	 current	economic	global	shift	does	not	really	go	with	how	the	world-systems	theory	was	first	established.	Thus,	when	studying	Brazil’s	general	allocation	in	the	world-systems	theory’s	categories	by	 analyzing	 the	 country’s	 top	 import	 and	 export	 products	 and	 its	 main	 import	 and	 export	destinations,	according	to	the	world-systems	theory,	Brazil	cannot	be	categorized	as	a	core	state,	and	neither	as	a	peripheral	state.	This	is	because	the	world-systems	theory	categorizes	Brazil	as	a	semi-peripheral	state,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Brazilian	economy	is	based	on	a	mix	of	core-like	industrial	products	(such	as	spacecraft	and	vehicle	parts)	and	peripheral,	raw	materials	(such	as	iron	ore,	soy,	and	coffee).	However,	it	is	somewhat	peculiar	that,	in	2014,	a	country	with	the	8th	largest	economy	of	the	world	can	still	not	be	a	part	of	the	world-systems	theory’s	core	category.	But,	 when	 considering	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 traditional	 division	 between	 core-like	 and	peripheral	production	processes	does	not	exactly	represent	the	current	economic	hierarchies	in	the	world,	it	is	maybe	not	so	relevant	to	use	the	world-systems	theory	to	explain	today’s	global	economic	power	balances	at	all.	When	analyzing	Brazil’s	trade	relations	with	the	United	States	in	the	previous	paragraph,	it	 became	 evident	 that,	 besides	 planes,	 helicopters,	 and/or	 spacecraft,	 Brazil	mostly	 exported	natural	 resources	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 which,	 according	 to	 the	 world-systems	 theory	 do	 not	necessarily	require	skilled	labor	and	which	can	be	produced	by	a	large	number	of	semi-peripheral	states.	 It	 also	 became	 clear	 that	 Brazil	 mainly	 imported	 technical	 end	 products,	 such	 as	telephones,	machinery,	and	computers	from	the	United	States.	The	data	of	Brazil’s	main	import	and	export	to	the	United	States	shows	that	the	export	of	Brazilian	core-like	products	stagnated	and	the	export	of	Brazilian	peripheral	raw	materials	increased	between	2001	and	2014.	It	can	be	stated	that	Brazil	as	a	part	of	the	bilateral	trade	relations	with	the	United	States,	according	to	the	world	systems	theory	and	in	this	particular	case	study,	did	qualify	as	a	semi-peripheral	country	because	of	its	mix	of	core-like	and	peripheral	production	processes,	and	the	United	States	as	core	country	with	its	core-like	production	processes.		
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However,	 this	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 quite	 problematic,	 since	 the	 country’s	 general	 economic	growth	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 Brazil	 was	 on	 its	 way	 to	 become	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 global	economies	 (as	 explained	 in	 chapter	 2)	 does	 not	 really	 align	with	Brazil	 being	 allocated	 in	 the	world-systems	 theory’s	 semi-periphery.	 Also,	Wallerstein’s	 argument,	 that	 the	 world-systems	theory	with	its	three	categories	continuously	enforces	the	dominance	of	the	core	states	could	be	refuted,	 since	 this	 research	 showed	 that	Brazil	 explored	other	options	 for	 its	 commercial	 ties,	especially	with	emerging,	industrialized	countries	located	in	the	global	South,	such	as	China	and	India.	This	means	that	the	United	States,	according	to	the	world-systems	theory	the	core	country	in	 this	 case	 study,	 lost	 some	 of	 its	 economic	 power	 not	 only	 in	 Brazil,	 but	 in	 the	 entire	 Latin	American	region.	Thus,	it	can	be	said	that	the	world-systems	theory	does	not	necessarily	enforce	the	 dominance	 of	 the	 core	 state,	 partly	 because	 states	 from	 the	 global	 South	 are	 increasingly	looking	for	South-South	cooperation,	which	slightly	sidelines	the	core	countries	from	the	global	North.	 This	 shift	 of	 economic	 power	 towards	 countries	 from	 the	 global	 South	 cannot	 be	adequately	explained	by	the	world-systems	theory,	since	this	theory	just	provides	a	framework	of	categories	to	explain	the	global	economy.	This	means	that,	as	long	as	states	remain	in	the	same	Wallersteinian	categories	as	before	the	shift,	as	is	the	case	with	Brazil	and	the	United	States,	the	industrialization	 and	 the	 rapid	 economic	 growth	 of	 some	 (semi-)peripheral	 countries	 and	 the	consequential	decrease	of	economic	power	of	some	core	states	in	the	past	two	to	three	decades,	do	not	fit	into	the	world-systems	theory.	
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CONCLUSION	In	this	thesis,	the	main	research	question	is	“Does	the	world-systems	theory	still	have	validity	to	
explain	the	trade	relationship	between	Brazil	and	the	U.S.	from	2001	until	2014?”	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	the	thesis	provided	basic	theoretical	knowledge	about	the	North-South	divide,	the	general	 rise	 of	 South-South	 cooperation,	 and	 it	 also	 provided	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	world-systems	theory	and	the	academic	critiques	about	this	theory.	Moreover,	this	research	also	gave	 information	about	 the	historical	 context	of	 this	 study,	 such	as	Brazil’s	 economic	 rise,	 the	country’s	increasing	South-South	cooperation	of	the	last	couple	of	decades,	and	the	basic	relations	between	Brazil	and	the	United	States	within	the	given	timeframe	of	2001-2014.	After	this,	in	the	analysis	part	of	 the	paper,	data	 about	Brazil’s	main	export	 and	 import	products,	Brazil’s	most	important	import	origins	and	export	destinations,	and	Brazil’s	top	import	products	from	and	top	export	products	to	the	United	States	in	2001	and	2014	was	gathered.	By	analyzing	this	data	and	by	linking	it	to	the	world-systems	theory,	it	gives	enough	information	and	knowledge	to	make	it	possible	to	test	the	world-systems	theory	by	using	the	basic	trade	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Brazil	between	2001	and	2014.	First	of	all,	after	analyzing	the	data	and	linking	it	to	the	world-systems	theory,	there	is	not	just	one	clear	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn.	This	is	not	a	complete	surprise,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	world-systems	theory	is	a	very	complex	and	broad	theory,	as	it	tends	to	categorize	the	entire	global	economy	into	just	three	categories.	Logically,	a	large	number	of	different	factors	is	at	play	when	 trying	 to	 allocate	 the	 economies	 of	 the	 world	 into	 the	 core	 or	 the	 (semi-)periphery.	Regarding	this,	answering	the	main	research	question	leads	to	a	conclusion	that	focuses	on	those	different	factors	as	well.	In	 chapter	1,	when	 setting	out	 the	basic	 structure	and	 the	basic	 theoretical	knowledge	about	 the	world-systems	 theory,	 it	was	 explained	 that	Wallerstein	 himself	 and	 other	 scholars	allocated	the	United	States	in	the	core	category	and	Brazil	in	the	semi-peripheral	category	of	the	world-systems	theory.	Later	on,	after	linking	the	basic	framework	of	the	world-systems	theory	to	the	obtained	data	in	section	3.2	of	this	thesis,	it	became	obvious	that	even	after	looking	closely	to	Brazil’s	main	import	and	export	products,	the	country’s	most	important	import	origins	and	export	destinations,	 and	 Brazil’s	 main	 import	 and	 export	 products	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 it	 was	 still	theoretically	correct	to	allocate	Brazil	in	the	semi-peripheral	category	and	the	United	States	in	the	core	 category	based	on	 the	 countries’	 dominant	production	processes.	Thus,	when	 testing	 the	theory	 only	 superficially,	 one	 could	 assume	 that	 the	 world-systems	 theory	 still	 has	 the	 basic	validity	to	explain	the	economic	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Brazil,	as	both	countries	are	still	located	in	the	same	categories	in	2014	as	when	the	theory	was	first	established.	However,	
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this	 conclusion	 is	 only	 relevant	when	 looking	 just	 at	 the	 plain	 data,	without	 rationalizing	 any	further.	The	use	of	the	world-systems	theory	to	explain	the	economies	ties	between	Brazil	and	the	United	States	becomes	somewhat	problematic	when	 focusing	on	 three	 factors	 that	are	slightly	intertwined:	 1)	 the	 vague	 definition	 of	 the	 semi-peripheral	 category;	 2)	 the	 basic	 global	 shift	including	 the	 increase	 of	 South-South	 cooperation;	 and	 3)	 the	 translocation	 of	 industrial	production	processes	towards	emerging	economies.	As	was	stated	in	chapter	1,	one	of	the	most	obvious	shortcomings	of	the	world-systems	theory	 is	 the	 vagueness	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 semi-peripheral	 category.	 As	 was	 explained,	Wallerstein	never	 really	 gave	 an	 exact	 explanation	of	what	 the	 semi-periphery	 is,	 and	what	 it	means	when	an	economy	is	allocated	in	this	category.	The	only	thing	that	becomes	clear	is	that	Wallerstein	 (2004)	 mentioned	 that	 the	 semi-periphery	 contains	 states	 that	 focus	 on	 both	peripheral	and	core-like	production	processes.	In	another	statement,	he	mentions	that	the	semi-peripheral	countries	find	themselves	in	a	difficult	situation,	as	these	countries	need	to	focus	on	not	 falling	 back	 into	 the	 periphery	 and	 on	 trying	 to	 enter	 the	 core	 category	 at	 the	 same	 time	(Wallerstein	 I.	 ,	 2004,	 p.	 29).	 However,	 as	 was	 explained	 earlier,	 Wallerstein’s	 list	 of	 semi-peripheral	countries	did	not	make	real	sense	(Arrighi	&	Drangel,	1986;	Terlouw,	1993).	It	can	be	concluded	 that	 the	vague	explanation	of	 the	 semi-periphery	 is	problematic	when	applying	 the	world-systems	theory	on	the	current	global	economy	and	on	Brazil	–	U.S.	trade	relations.	As	we	have	 seen,	 rapidly	 emerging	 countries	 from	 the	 global	 South,	 which	 once	 belonged	 to	 the	periphery,	are	on	their	way	to	becoming	important	global	powers	with	the	potential	to	surpass	the	traditional	core	countries.	It	feels	odd	to	categorize	Brazil,	which	is	one	of	these	states,	into	such	 a	 broad	 category	 as	 the	 semi-periphery.	 This	 thesis	 made	 clear	 that	 there	 are	 different	degrees	of	development,	even	among	the	countries	of	the	global	South.	Therefore,	a	clearer	and	more	 distinguished	 theoretical	 definition	 of	 Wallerstein’s	 semi-periphery	 would	 help	 to	categorize	the	current	global	economy	into	categories	and	thus	make	the	world-systems	theory	more	accurate	and	relevant.	But,	are	the	three	categories:	the	core,	the	semi-periphery,	and	the	periphery	still	valuable	tools	 to	explain	 today’s	global	economic	reality?	 	When	analyzing	 the	data	about	Brazil’s	main	import	origins	and	main	export	origins,	it	became	obvious	that	in	the	relatively	short	period	from	2001	 until	 2014,	 China	 replaced	 the	 United	 States	 as	 Brazil’s	 main	 trade	 partner.	 This	 had	everything	 to	 do	with	 Brazil’s	 rising	 focus	 on	 South-South	 cooperation	 and	 China’s	 emerging	industrialization	and	its	need	for	natural	resources.	Although	there	is	some	room	for	global	shift	in	the	world-systems	theory,	this	is	purely	based	on	shifts	in	production	processes	(what	is	core-
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like	 today	 will	 be	 peripheral	 tomorrow	 (Wallerstein	 I.	 ,	 2004,	 p.	 29)).	 The	 broader	 shift	 in	economic	ties	between	states	does	not	really	fit	in	the	theory.	For	instance,	the	fact	that	the	United	States	loses	some	of	its	economic	power	in	Brazil	cannot	be	explained	by	using	the	world-systems	theory,	since	both	Brazil	and	the	United	States	remain	inside	the	same	categories	according	to	the	world-systems	 theory.	 Also,	 the	 theory	 is	 just	 a	 framework	 for	 allocating	 economies	 into	categories	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 transnational	 division	 of	 labor	 and	 not	 for	 explaining	differing	relations	between	countries	that	stay	in	the	same	category,	as	is	the	case	for	the	United	States	and	Brazil.	Therefore,	the	world-systems	theory	fails	to	adequately	explain	the	shift	that	takes	place	in	the	economic	relations	between	Brazil	and	the	United	States.	Another	 serious	 problem	when	 using	 the	world-systems	 theory	 to	 explain	 the	 current	economic	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Brazil	is	closely	related	to	the	problem	with	the	global	 shift.	 As	 explained	 in	 this	 research,	 the	 production	 of	 manufactured	 goods	 moved	 to	emerging	 industrializing	 economies	 in	 the	 global	 South,	 as	 the	 production	 of	 these	 industrial	products	is	cheaper	in	those	countries	because	of	lower	costs.	As	already	explained,	a	result	of	this	is	that	the	prices	of	manufactured	goods	decrease,	and	the	prices	of	natural	resources	increase	because	 of	 the	 growing	 demand.	 This	 causes	 a	 serious	 shift	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 value	 of	 natural	resources	 and	 the	 value	 of	 manufactured	 goods,	 and	 thus	 in	 the	 value	 of	 the	 corresponding	economies	that	produce	these	products.	All	 in	 all,	 there	 is	nothing	wrong	with	 categorizing	economies	of	 the	world	 in	order	 to	obtain	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	global	economic	situation.	However,	after	this	research,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	world-systems	theory,	as	it	was	traditionally	created,	is	outdated	and	partly	unable	 to	explain	 the	economic	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Brazil	between	2001	and	2014,	and	the	global	economic	reality	of	the	past	thirty	years.	This	is	not	odd,	especially	when	keeping	in	mind	that	over	the	last	half	century	a	lot	has	changed	in	our	world.	Thus,	is	it	necessary	to	completely	ignore	this	theory	when	studying	the	current	global	order?	I	would	not	say	so.	As	mentioned,	nothing	is	wrong	with	categorizing	the	world	into	a	framework	that	makes	it	easier	to	understand.	However,	some	adaptions	to	the	theory	could	be	made	to	make	it	more	complete	and	accurate	for	analyzing	current	times.	First	of	all,	a	clear	and	structured	definition	including	different	degrees	within	especially	 the	 semi-periphery,	but	 also	 the	other	 categories	would	help	to	give	a	more	complete	image	of	relations	between	countries	from	one	category	(for	example	South-South	cooperation),	and	among	countries	from	different	categories	and	their	shifts	inside	and	between	categories.	Moreover,	the	focus	on	peripheral	production	processes	and	core-like	processes	needs	to	be	revised	in	order	for	the	theory	to	be	relevant	for	explaining	the	current	global	order,	as	economies	with	a	focus	on	production	of	natural	resources	are	not	necessarily	weak,	 and	 countries	 that	 focus	 on	 industrial	 production	 are	 not	 per	 se	 stronger	 economies.	
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Therefore,	 it	would	be	better	to	 look	at	a	bigger	picture	(for	 instance	including	trade	partners,	GDP,	and	possessions)	than	to	just	emphasize	the	type	of	production	processes	when	trying	to	allocate	an	economy	in	one	of	the	Wallersteinian	categories.	In	this	way,	the	outcome	will	be	more	complex	 and	 relevant,	 and	 it	 would	 explain	 the	 current	 world	 order	 in	 a	much	more	 correct	manner.		 	
	 35	
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